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Abstract 
Shopping Malls are diffusing in Turkey because it provides comfortable shopping opportunities to consumers. It is 
accepted that shopping malls show special kind of network externalities and because of that reason it is an example of 
two-sided markets. Merchants in shopping mall benefit from the numerical value of visitors in shopping mall and so 
management of this shopping mall utilize from numbers of consumers, too. Therefore, rational managers should 
encourage consumers to visit their malls. However, management of some shopping malls charge parking so that this 
fee will be discouraging factor for consumers. The purpose of this study is to search the decision of rational managers 
of shopping malls about parking fee by using profit functions. Can the charges be profitable or not for rational 
managers? In which conditions it can be preferred? 
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1. Introduction 
Rapid development of retailing has led to expansion of shopping malls in Turkey. Malls bring functional 
benefits to consumers and increase their satisfaction (Khare, 2011:110), for example; convenient 
shopping, shopping without traffic and crowded, activities other than shopping etc (Erkip, 2005:100). 
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(Khare, 2011:110). Jackson (et al, 2011:1) studied about mall attributes which drive customers to visit 
shopping mall.  
Last studies show shopping malls as an example of two-sided markets in which cross network 
externalities exist (Rochet and Tirole, 2003: 993-994; Dilek et.al 2012:579; Dilek and Top, 2012:778; 
Dilek, 2012:125). Hildebrand (2012) tried to measure network effects in two-sided markets. Three actors 
exist in shopping malls including merchants, consumers (visitors) and mall management. Benefits of 
merchants rely on numbers of consumers and also benefits of consumers rely on numbers of merchants. 
As the number of merchants increase, consumers find more alternatives to choose. In other side, as the 
number of visitors of mall increase, merchants can sell more products and so get more profit. This 
dependence is interesting reality of two-sided markets (Bolt and Tieman, 2005:3; Dilek, et.al, 2012; 
Dilek, 2012; Dilek and Top, 2012). Shopping mall managers generally want to increase the number of 
visitors because their profits depend on profits of merchants in shopping mall. Charging visits of 
consumers to shopping mall is not good for mall managers because of high demand elasticity of 
consumers. If demand elasticity of consumers is high enough, they can give up visiting shopping malls. 
Generally, demand elasticity of consumers is higher than the demand elasticity of merchants. Therefore, 
generally shopping mall managers prefer to price merchants instead of consumers (Armstrong and 
Wright, 2007:355; Dilek, et.al, 2012:534; Rochet and Tirole, 2003:992). In Fra
for parking and also they can buy gasoline at a substantial discount (Rochet and Tirole, 2003:991). It is 
just for encouraging visits of consumers. This behaviour is similar to newspapers or magazines, which 
charge advertisements but not charge readers (Kaiser and Wright, 2006:2). Consumers can prefer to visit 
malls with their cars, so they need auto park services. Erkip (2005:100) told that one reason of preferring 
malls is easy parking. Though pricing parking services discourage consumers from visiting shopping 
malls, managers can charge it. According to the decision of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Transport 
Coordination Centre (UKOME) and Council of State, t price parking up to three 
hours (http://ulasim.ibb.gov.tr/KararArsivi/UKOME/2007/UKOME-2007-1.pdf). Though network effects 
of two-sided markets as told above, shopping malls are reluctant to let consumers parking free of charge 
(Sabah, 2012). The purpose of this study is to search reasons of shopping malls and economical results of 
their decisions. Though in economic literature there can be found many studies interested with shopping 
malls and two-sided markets (Bolt and Tieman, 2005; Dilek and Top, 2012; Dilek et al 2012, Dilek, 
2012 alls based on two-
sided market except Hasker and Eren (2011). Hasker and Eren (2011) analysed why shopping malls 
decide to provide parking for free and embed the parking costs in prices of goods. This study will try to 
fill this gap.  
 
2. Profit Function Of Shopping Mall Managers 
 
Though in two-sided markets platforms can earn money from seller and buyer side, their pricing decisions 
can be changed because of the demand elasticity. Platforms can decide to price one side (buyer or seller) 
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of market and subsidize the other side. They must choose price structure addition to price level (Rochet 
and Tirole; 2003: 990). The models of Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Julien (2003) revealed that 
platform managers might set negative prices on one side of market. Amelio and Julien (2012:436) set a 
model in which platforms use tying strategies as a tool to introduce implicit subsidy. Shortly, platforms 
set negative prices on the side which has higher demand elasticity while they get profits from the other 
side which has lower demand elasticity. Income of shopping mall managers has two sources including 
sources from merchants and consumers. Assume that shopping mall have no cost. So, their profit just 
depends on revenue of them from merchants and consumers. 
 
TR= Revenue from merchants + Revenue from consumers 
TR= TR1 + TR2                                       (1) 
 
Revenue from merchants is product of rent and number of merchants. In two-sided markets cross network 
externality works and therefore utility of merchants increase as the number of visitors increase. So, 
number of merchants is an increasing function of visitor numbers. Equation (2) denotes revenue of mall 
management sourced from merchants. In this equation Pr is the value of rent price and nv is the number of 
visitors in mall. Q(nv) is a function which denotes number of merchants and it increases as number of 
visitors increase. 
TR1= Pr * Q(nv)          (2) 
 
Generally managers of mall owever most of shopping malls price parking. 
Hasker and Eren (2011:35) found that society wants parking to be free and more than the profit 
maximizing amount of parking provided by shopping malls. According to Hasker and Eren (2011:36), 
parking fee should be absorbed in the price of the good. However, we supposed that prices of parking are 
not embed in rents or prices of goods for just simplicity. Parking is important for visitors who come to 
shopping mall by their vehicles. As a result, revenue of mall from shoppers depends on parking fee and 
number of visitors. We suppose that all consumers have cars and they are willingfull to pay parking fee. 
Also parking area is used only people who are visiting and shopping in mall. In Equation (3) which shows 
revenue of mall from visitors, Pp denotes parking fee. Also nv(Pp) is a decreasing function of parking fee. 
 
TR2= Pp * nv(Pp)                         (3) 
 
Thanks to equation (2) and equation (3) we can rewrite equation (1) as below. 
 
TR= [Pr * Q(nv(Pp)]+ [Pp * nv(Pp)]       (4) 
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3. Number of Visitors Function:  
If nv(Pp) is a linear function such that  nv(Pp)=k0-k1pp and k0,k1>0 then we can rewrite total revenue 
function of shopping mall management as below (5). 
 
TR= [Pr * Q(k0-k1pp)]+ [Pp * (k0-k1pp)]       (5) 
 
Also if Q(k0-k1p) is linear function then equation (5) become like (6) such that Q(nv)=k2nv+k3, k2,k3>0. 
 
TR= [Pr * (k2(k0-k1pp)+k3)]+ [Pp * (k0-k1pp)]     (6) 
=   21031202 pprprr PkkPkPPkkPkkP     (6a) 
4. Profit Maximizer Mall Managers 
What will be the parking fee if mall managers are profit maximizer? To find this we can use first order 
conditions. We recall (6a) to calculate it. 
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So, parking fee is negatively related to rent. How do we explain this mechanism? Suppose that mall 
management increase rents. Because of higher rents, some of merchants will leave business (exit) in 
to leave the mall, they will help them to increase 
their profits. Rational merchants are generally interested in profits and they are not willing any decrease 
in their profits. Generally, increase in visitor number means increase in profits for merchants. Because 
some of visitors will come to their shop and most probably purchase something. So, if mall managers do 
something to increase the number of visitors, merchants will benefit from this. Parking fee is a kind of 
cost for visitors; therefore they are not willing to pay this cost. If parking fee decreases, the number of 
visitors will increase.  
 
5. In A Situation Of Fixed Rents 
this situation Total Revenue function of mall managers has only one independent variable parking fee. 
We recall (6a) again. 
2
1031202)( pprprrp PkkPkPPkkPkkPPTR  
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The equation (8) is simply quadratic equation. This equation is just a parabola which can be seen in graph 
1. It is seen that Pp axis of vertex pint is negative. The reason of it is high value of rent (Pr). It is so high 
that value of 
1
120
2k
kkPkP rp is negative. Maximum profit for mall management can be reached if only 
parking fee is negative. However, it is obvious that 
managers in real life. Mall managers must consider parking fees bigger than 0 TL.  
 
Graph 1. Total Revenue and Parking Fee. 
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Mall managers search for optimum alternative in the interval in which parking fee is at least equal to zero. 
It is obvious that maximum total revenue is reached when parking fee is zero. However, in reality some 
malls prefer to set price bigger than zero. We assumed that all of the customers are also visitors and 
shoppers of mall. However, there are some people who do not care about shopping but want to use 
parking area of mall. Mall managers may prefer positive parking fees to distinguish consumers with cars 
and people who just look for parking place for their cars.  
If mall managers set up 
will prefer to use parking area of shopping mall. It is valid especially for malls which are settled in centre 
of cities. Generally parking area of shopping malls are limited, so many potential customers with cars 
 
 
6. Parking Fee Discrimination 
To distinguish customers and others, mall managers may use parking fees as tools. For example; most of 
tomers who spend more than x TL (more expensive than 
023 kkPPkTR rr  
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market parking fee) while others pay positive parking fee. Also when you have parked your car longer 
than 2 or 3 hour you will pay though you buy something from mall. We can call this as parking fee 
discrimination. Parking fee discrimination has some similarities with second degree price discrimination. 
As it is known, second degree price discrimination exists when larger quantities can be bought at a lower 
unit price. Firm offers a menu of bundles to choose from. (Tirole, 1989:142-143). In parking fee 
discrimination you can both buy something from mall and benefit from parking services. Addition to this, 
you will pay lower unit fee if your parking time increase. It should be discussed that if parking fee 
discrimination is an example of second degree price discrimination. 
 When shopping mall managers use this parking fee discrimination there will exist three results: First, 
people who do not want to shop will not use parking area of shopping mall and look for other parking 
areas which are cheaper than shopping mall parking area. Second, potential customers will find parking 
area for their cars easily. Third, though some people, who do not think about shopping, will both decide 
to use parking area of shopping mall and shop in that mall.  Because of second and third effect, shoppers 
and visitors of mall increase. So, income and profits of merchants increase and they will be ready for 
paying more for rents. Rents are more important income sources for mall managers than parking fees. 
Shopping mall managers generally use parking fee discrimination not for income from parking but for 
rents. 
Parking fee discrimination can be mandatory choice for some of mall managers. Especially, in the centre 
of cities there are many people who are looking for parking area for their cars, but not want to buy 
something from shopping malls. The numbers of such people 
find parking area for their cars. If mall managers do not distinguish shoppers and people just looking for 
parking area merchants will lose money and rents will decrease.  
We supposed that all people, who are using parking area, are also visitors and shoppers of the mall. What 
will be if half of them are only looking for parking area for their cars? First recall (5). The revenue of the 
mall is defined by the function of TR= TR1+ TR2. If some of parkers give up shopping and visiting mall, 
revenue from rents will decrease. Because less consumer means less sale and income for merchants and 
therefore they will be unwillingful to pay rent. Revenue from parkers does not change because the 
numbers of parkers do not change. Though their number is fixed, some of parkers are not shopping and 
visiting mall now.  
 
Definition: Parking Fee Elasticity of Visiting Shopping Mall. 
If 
consumers are driving cars they will interest in parking fees. As parking fee increase their willingness to 
visit shopping mall decreases. We can use parking fee elasticity of visiting for measuring the visiting 
number responds to a change in parking fee. It is calculated with a similar formula to price elasticity of 
demand. It is defined to be the percent change in visiting number divided by the percent change in 
parking fee.  
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This elasticity is generally negative. Therefore it is convenient to use absolute value. The change in 
number of visitors and the change in parking fees are negatively related. We can show the relation 
between them in Graph 2. As parking fee increase, fewer customers want to visit shopping mall. So, 
number of visitor function has negative slope. This relationship is the reason for negative parking fee 
elasticity.   
 
Graph 2. Number of Visitor Function 
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If 1number of visitors function are inelastic. If it is equal to one it is unit elastic and if it is bigger 
than one it is elastic. Elasticity is important, because if number of visitors function is inelastic, mall 
management will increase parking fee easily. When the function is inelastic, the increase in price does not 
have large effects on number of visitors. Otherwise, the small increase in parking fee will create ultimate 
decrease in number of visitors. Therefore, shopping mall managers give importance to the parking fee 
elasticity.  
Most important factor which effects number of visitors  elasticity is competition or other shopping malls. 
As the market power of shopping mall increases, elasticity decreases. Assume that there are many 
shopping malls which have similar facilities for visitors. In that situation an increase in parking fee will 
discourage many potential visitors to visit. They will easily give up visiting this shopping mall and go to 
other shopping mall. Shortly, if shopping mall has many close substitutes elasticity will be smaller. 
Other important factor which effects elasticity is attributes of shopping mall. Some studies found that 
convenience, accessibility, the presence of services such as banks and restaurants, recreational attributes, 
pleasure, social aspects are important in choice of shopping mall (Jackson, et. Al, 2011:3). If shopping 
mall meets such kinds of needs for consumers changing decisions about shopping mall will be difficult 
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for customers. They will pay costs if they want to visit another shopping mall. In other words attributes of 
shopping mall effect elasticity. 
 
Conclusion 
Shopping malls are important part of urban life in modern cities. In Turkey they are diffusing as it does in 
other developing countries. In economic theory they are evaluated as an example of two-sided markets. 
Profit maximizing mall managers should interest in the nature of two-sided markets that exhibits cross 
network externalities. Utility of merchants increase as number of visitors increases and vice versa. In 
other words, utility of visitors increase as number of merchants increases. In Turkey policy makers and 
society have given importance to parking fees of shopping malls. Our study interested in rational 
behaviour of mall managers about parking fees. We revealed the reason of parking fee discriminations 
and infrastructure of charging parking in malls. In one side parking fees are income for visitors of mall, 
on the other side it decreases the number of visitors and therefore merchants become unwillingfull to pay 
higher rents. Mall managers should make decisions by considering these two facts. This study enlightens 
the reasons of profit maximizing mall managers because of that reason we hope that it will open path for 
further studies in economic theory.  
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